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ABSTRACT
In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, discretionary
monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria.  Complementarity between the pricing decisions of
forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically dynamic in nature. At each
point in time, the discretionary monetary authority optimally accommodates the level of
predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is concerned solely about real
activity.  Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current period, an individual firm will optimally
choose a high price because it knows that the monetary authority next period will accommodate with
a high money supply. Under commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the
monetary authority commits not to respond to future predetermined prices.
We compute a traditional inflation bias equilibrium, in which price-setters are optimistic, rationally
expecting small adjustments by other firms. But there is another steady-state equilibrium in which
price setters are pessimistic and inflation is much higher. Further, we find that there are multiple
equilibria at a point in time, not just in steady states. In a stochastic setting with equilibrium
selection each period determined by an i.i.d. sunspot, there is greater inflation bias on average than
if price-setters were always optimistic. The sunspot realization also has real effects: periods of
higher than average inflation are accompanied by low output. Thus, increased real volatility may be
an additional cost of discretion in monetary policy.
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rking@bu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the debate over rules versus discretion for monetary policy, the primary argument
against discretion has been that it leads to a higher average inﬂa t i o nt h a ni so p t i m a l
with commitment. In the consensus basic model which has developed following Kyd-
land and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983], the discretionary monetary
authority seeks to produce unexpected inﬂation to stimulate real output, which is in-
eﬃciently low because of distortions in the economy. But since it cannot fool agents
in rational expectations equilibrium, the discretionary monetary authority produces
expected inﬂation that has a negligible real eﬀect on output, while imposing other
costs on the economy.
By contrast, this paper provides an example of a diﬀerent, potentially adverse,
consequence of discretionary monetary policy: it can lead to multiple equilibria and,
thus, to the possibility of endogenous ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and real activity that
are not related to the economy’s fundamentals. We illustrate this possibility within a
simple dynamic macroeconomic model that has important New Keynesian features:
(i) monopolistic competition, making output ineﬃciently low; and (ii) a staggered
pricing structure in which ﬁrms set nominal prices that must be held ﬁxed for two
periods. These two features give the monetary authority some leverage over real
activity.
In this simple setting, the multiplicity of equilibria derives from interaction be-
tween two features of the economy. First, ﬁrms adopt forward-looking pricing rules
because their nominal prices are held ﬁx e df o rt w op e r i o d s .I nc h o o s i n gap r i c e ,ﬁrms
in the current period need to form expectations about the behavior of the monetary
authority — and ﬁrms — in the next period. A higher future money supply leads to
a higher future nominal marginal cost, which raises the optimal price for a ﬁrm in
the current period. Second, under discretion, the monetary authority takes as given
prices set in previous periods in determining its choice of the money stock in each
period. Since its concern is to maximize the welfare of the representative agent, which
depends on real variables, it chooses a money stock that is proportional to the price
set by ﬁrms in the previous period, which we call a homogenous money stock rule.
The combination of forward-looking pricing with discretionary policy leads to
complementarity between the price-setting actions of ﬁrms: if all other ﬁrms set a
higher price in the current period, the monetary authority will set a higher money
supply in the subsequent period, raising the desired price for a single ﬁrm in the
current period.
We show that this policy-induced complementarity implies that there are typically
two private-sector equilibria which can prevail at any point in time and two steady-
state equilibria. In general, there is one equilibrium in which ﬁrms expect small
adjustments and the newly set price is relatively close to the price that ﬁrms set
last period. But there is another in which the adjusting ﬁrms make a much larger
adjustment.
2Because this multiplicity of equilibria arises for arbitrary homogenous monetary
policies, it also arises with an optimizing monetary authority who cannot commit
to future actions. We begin by considering settings of perfect foresight, in which
the monetary authority and private agents each assume that only one of the two
types of private sector equilibria will occur. We show that there are two steady-
state discretionary equilibria, one with low inﬂa t i o nb i a sa n do n ew i t hh i g hi n ﬂation
bias. It is notable that the complementarity which generates multiple equilibria is
entirely due, in our model, to the nature of monetary policy under discretion. That
is: our speciﬁcation of preferences and the labor market is such that there is no
complementarity in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms if the central bank maintains
a ﬁxed nominal money stock. Our setup thus highlights the role of discretionary
monetary policy in generating complementarity.
There are three components of the existing literature to which our paper relates.
First, there is the voluminous literature on monetary policy under discretion, which
begins with Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983]. In that lit-
erature, output is ineﬃciently low, but can be raised by policies that also produce
unexpected inﬂation. There are costs of actual inﬂation, so that a consistent equi-
librium exhibits an inﬂation bias. The model that captures these ideas involves a
quadratic monetary authority objective and a linear economic model. There is a
unique discretionary equilibrium in the standard model (absent reputational eﬀects
or trigger strategies).
Second, there is an important recent literature that works out how the standard
KPBG model can be derived from a fully articulated New Keynesian framework. The
key ingredients of the models in this literature are that output is ineﬃciently low due
to monopoly distortions; the monetary authority has temporary leverage over the
real economy because of staggered price setting; and the costs of actual inﬂation are
welfare losses associated with relative price distortions. In these settings, just as in
the KPBG model, there is an inﬂation bias under discretion.1 However, this analysis
has been conducted within linearized versions of modern sticky price models.
Our analysis takes the most basic fully articulated New Keynesian model, without
linearizing, and shows that there are multiple equilibria. Our model features costs
of stimulative policies — which bring about actual inﬂation — that stem from relative
price distortions across goods. It also features beneﬁts from unexpected stimulative
policies, which lower monopoly markups and raise output toward the ﬁrst best level.
Our model is an explicitly dynamic one, with ﬁrms forecasting future inﬂation when
setting nominal prices for two periods. As we have stressed above, multiple equilibria
can occur in our model due to complementarity mechanisms similar to those stressed
in the literature on coordination failures. The possibility of such responses is excluded
by a model that is linear.
1For a textbook treatment, see the derivation in Woodford [2002, chapter 3]. The inﬂation
bias result under discretion within such optimizing New Keynesian models has been popularized by
Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1999].
3Third, our paper is closely related to recent work by Albanesi, Chari and Chris-
tiano [2002]. They ﬁnd multiple equilibria in an essentially static model where a
portion of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms must set prices before the monetary
authority’s action in each period. At the same time, the structure of the model they
study is quite diﬀerent from ours. The stimulative policies that produce inﬂation in
their model also raise nominal interest rates and lead to money demand distortions,
either by driving a relative price wedge between the cost of buying goods on cash
and credit or by increasing transactions time. A monetary authority thus faces a
trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of driving down the markup and these costs. In our
model, instead of the costs of realized inﬂation being related to money demand, they
involve price distortions across goods whose prices were set in diﬀerent periods.
If there are sunspots which switch the economy between equilibria, there are also
important diﬀerences in the consequences that are suggested by our model from those
suggested by the ACC models. In our setting, if a high inﬂation equilibrium occurs
when agents attach low probability to such an event, then there will be a decline
in output because aggregate demand will fall and the average markup will increase.
By contrast, in the ACC models, a switch from low inﬂation to high inﬂation will
have little eﬀect on the average markup or output, with the main diﬀerence being
the extent of money demand distortions. Since the ACC models are essentially static
ones, there is also another diﬀerence: there is no feedback between the likelihood that
economic agents attach to future equilibria and the levels of inﬂation and output at
a point in time. Accordingly beliefs about the future are of no bearing for current
events. In our model, beliefs about future outcomes aﬀect the nature of the current
policy problem because ﬁrms setting their price in the current period care about both
current and future monetary policy.
2M o d e l
The model economy that we study is a particular fully articulated “New Keynesian”
framework, featuring monopolistic competition and nominal prices which are ﬁxed
for two periods. There is staggered pricing, with one-half of a continuum of ﬁrms
adjusting price in each period. Since all of the ﬁrms have the same technology and
face the same demand conditions, it is natural to think of all adjusting ﬁrms as
c h o o s i n gt h es a m ep r i c e .W ei m p o s et h i ss y m m e t r yc o n d i t i o ni no u ra n a l y s i s .
There are many diﬀerent types of New Keynesian models, which diﬀer in terms of
their implications for the extent of complementarity in price-setting. Our particular
model assumes that (i) there is a constant elasticity demand structure originating
from a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of diﬀerentiated products; (ii) there is a centralized
labor market so that the common marginal cost for all ﬁrms is powerfully aﬀected by
aggregate demand; and (iii) preferences for goods and leisure display exactly oﬀsetting
income and substitution eﬀects of wage changes, as is common in the literature on
real business cycles. Kimball [1995] and Woodford [2002] have stressed that these
4assumptions make it diﬃcult to generate complementarity between price-setters when
there is an exogenous money stock. As we will, see our model has exactly zero
complementarity in this situation. From our perspective, this is a virtue because
it highlights the importance of the policy-based complementarity that arises from
monetary policy under discretion.2
2.1 Households
There is a representative household, which values consumption (ct) and leisure (lt)






with β being the discount factor which is taken to be close to one. We assume that
the momentary utility function takes the form
u(ct,l t)=l o g ( ct)+χlt (2)
which implies that there are exactly oﬀ-setting income and substitution eﬀects of
wage changes. It also has some other convenient implications that we describe later.
As is standard in the analyses of imperfect competition macro models that follow
Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] and Rotemberg [1987], we assume that consumption
is an aggregate of a continuum of individual goods, ct =[
R 1
0 ct(z)(ε−1)/εdz]ε/(ε−1).
Households distribute their expenditure eﬃciently across these goods, resulting in
constant-elasticity demands for individual products from each of the two types of







The subscript j in (3) denotes the age of the nominal price, so that P0,t is the price
set by ﬁr m si np e r i o dta n dP1,t is the price set by ﬁrms one period previously (
P1,t = P0,t−1). Likewise, cj,t is the period-t demand for goods produced by a ﬁrm that




















2Glomm and Ravikumar [1995] show how endogenous government policy of a diﬀe r e n ts o r t—
public education — can generate multiple equilbria.
5so that our model imposes a constant, unit velocity, in common with many macro-
economic analyses.3 We adopt this speciﬁcation because it allows us to abstract
from all the wealth and substitution eﬀects that normally arise in optimizing mod-
els of money demand, so as to focus on the consequences of price-stickiness. With
constant-elasticity demands for each good, the money-demand speciﬁcation in (5)
implies
Mt = Ptct. (6)
Since this is a representative agent model and since no real accumulation is possible
given the technologies described below, we are not too explicit about the consumption-
saving aspect of the household’s problem; it will be largely irrelevant in general equi-
librium except for asset-pricing. We simply assume that there is a Lagrange multiplier








and that households equate the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and





In each case, the second equality indicates the implications of the speciﬁc utility
function introduced above.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce output according to a linear technology, where for convenience we
set the marginal product of labor to one. So, for each type of ﬁrm, the production
function is
cj,t = nj,t. (9)
This implies that real marginal cost is unrelated to the scale of the ﬁrm or its type
and is simply
ψt = wt
and that nominal marginal cost is Ψt = Ptψt = Ptwt
Much of our analysis will focus on the implications of eﬃcient price-setting by the
monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. The adjusting ﬁrms in period t are assumed to
set prices so as to maximize the expected present discounted value of their revenues,
using the household’s marginal utility as a (possibly stochastic) discount factor. That
is, they choose P0,t to maximize their market value,
3We think of this quantity equation as the limiting version of a standard money demand function
which occurs as the own return on money is raised toward the nominal interest rate (see King and
Wolman [1999] for some additional discussion).




As monopolistic competitors, ﬁrms understand that c0,t =(
P0,t
Pt )−εct and that c1,t+1 =
(
P0,t
Pt+1)−εct+1,b u tt a k ect,P t,c t+1 and Pt+1 as not aﬀected by their pricing decisions.




















w h e r ew ea g a i ng i v et h er e s u l tu n d e rt h es p e c i ﬁc momentary utility function. In fact,
this reveals one motivation for the form of the particular utility function chosen. In
general, both aggregate demand (ct)a n dt h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r( λt)a ﬀect the weights,
but our choice of a utility function that is logarithmic in consumption means that
these two eﬀects exactly cancel out. With perfect foresight, the pricing equation can




[(1 − θt,t+1)Ψt + θt,t+1Ψt+1]; (11)
the optimal price is a constant markup (ε/(ε − 1)) over a weighted average of nominal




















The weights on current and future nominal marginal cost represent the shares of
marginal revenue associated with the current and future periods.
2.3 Deﬁning Complementarity in Price Setting
The standard deﬁnition of complementarity — contained, for example, in Cooper and
John [1988]— is that the optimal action of one decision-maker is increasing in the
actions of other similar decision-makers. In our context, we are interested in com-
plementarity in price-setting in equation (11). The left-hand side of this expression
is the action of the particular decision-maker under study: the optimal price of an
individual monopolistically competitive ﬁrm that is currently making a price adjust-
ment. Other monopolistically competitive ﬁrms are also simultaneously adjusting
prices: these ﬁrms take an action P0,t that inﬂuences the right-hand of (11). The
price chosen by the representative adjusting ﬁrm inﬂuences the price level directly








1−ε and may also aﬀect current nominal marginal cost.
Given that prices are sticky, there can be real eﬀects of variations in the price level, so
that these could inﬂuence nominal marginal cost. Finally, the weights on the present
and the future in (11) also depend on the price level. To determine whether there is
7complementarity, we must work through these mechanisms and determine the sign
of the relevant partial derivative. The extent of complementarity will depend on the
behavior of the monetary authority.
2.4 Timing
The sequence of actions within a period is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the monetary
authority chooses the money stock, Mt, taking as given P1,t, the price set by ﬁrms in
the previous period. In the second stage, adjusting ﬁrms set prices (P0,t). Simulta-
neously, wages are determined and exchange occurs in labor and goods markets.
There are two important consequences of these timing assumptions. First, since
price-setters move after the monetary authority, they cannot be surprised by the
monetary authority during the initial period that their price is in eﬀect. Accordingly,
the monetary authority faces an economy in which it can surprise some agents (those
with pre-set prices) but not others (those adjusting prices) within a period. This
gives rise to a relative price distortion across ﬁrms in the discretionary equilibrium
that we construct, which in turn means that there is an interior solution for the
monetary authority’s choice problem. If we reversed the timing order so that the
monetary authority moved last, we conjecture that there would not be a discretionary
equilibrium unless some other aspect of the economy were modiﬁed, such as allowing
ﬁrms to reset their prices after paying an adjustment cost.4 Second, the fact that the
price-setters move after the monetary authority means that there is the potential for
more than one equilibrium price to correspond to a given monetary policy action.
2.5 Complementarity with an exogenous money stock
We now consider a situation in which Mt = Mt+1 = M. Under the assumptions of
our model, it turns out to be easy to investigate the inﬂuence of other adjusting ﬁrm’s
actions, i.e., to compute the eﬀect of P0,t on the right-hand side of (11). With the
constant velocity assumption (Ptct = Mt) and with the particular utility function,
Ψt = Ptwt = Pt(χct). Hence, equilibrium nominal marginal cost is exactly propor-
tional to the money stock, Ψt = χMt. Since the nominal money stock is assumed





This equilibrium relationship means that there is an exactly zero eﬀect of P0,t on the
right-hand side: there is no complementarity in price-setting in this model when the
nominal money supply is constant.
4The nonexistence of a discretionary equilibrium is a feature of Ireland’s [1997] analysis of a
model in which all prices are set simultaneously, before the monetary authority determines the
current money supply.
82.6 Summarizing the economy by p0 and m
Under discretionary policy, the monetary authority will not choose to keep the nom-
inal money supply constant. Therefore, the optimal pricing condition (11) will not
simplify to a static equation. In general, however, equilibrium will be a function of
just two variables: a measure of the price set by adjusting ﬁrms and a measure of
monetary policy. We construct these variables by normalizing nominal prices and
money by the single nominal state variable in this economy, the price set by ﬁrms in
the previous period (P1,t = P0,t−1). Deﬁne the normalized money supply as
mt = Mt/P1,t, (13)
and the normalized price set by adjusting ﬁrms in the current period as
p0,t = P0,t/P1,t. (14)
We can then express all variables of interest as functions of these two normalized
















Aggregate demand is a function of both p0,t and mt :





















2c1,t], we can use the individual demands
together to show that total labor input is also pinned down by p0,t and mt :
nt = n(p0,t,m t) ≡
1
2








Leisure is the diﬀerence between the time endowment and labor input. Marginal cost
is
ψt = wt =
∂u(ct,l t)/∂lt
∂u(ct,l t)/∂ct
= χct = ψ(mt,p 0,t).
9Another variable of interest is the gross inﬂation rate, Pt+1/Pt. It is determined by
current and future p0:
Pt+1
Pt
















In a steady state, there is thus a simple relationship between inﬂation and the relative
price, π = p0.
2.7 Two distortions and monetary policy
The monetary authority in this model faces two distortions that are present in the
private economy and can be inﬂuenced by its actions. First, there is a markup distor-
tion that represents the wedge between price and marginal cost: it has consequences
similar to those of a tax on labor income. The extent of this average markup is just














From the derivations above, the markup depends on p0,t and mt: µt = g(p0,t)/(χmt).
Second, there is a relative price distortion that represents a wedge between inputs
and outputs:











The relative price distortion depends solely on p0,t. It takes on a value of unity at
p0,t =1(this would be the case in a zero inﬂation steady state) and is higher for other
values of p0,t.T h et r a d e - o ﬀ that the monetary authority typically faces between these
two distortions is that choosing a higher money supply decreases the markup (good)
and raises the relative price distortion (bad).
Just as we showed above that all real variables could be described in terms of p0
and m, the distortions can be described similarly. The summary role of p0 and m,
t o g e t h e rw i t ht h ef a c tt h a ta ta n yp o i n ti nt i m et h em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t yc a nc h o o s e
m (i.e. choosing m in the current period is no diﬀerent than choosing M)h a sa
strong implication for the analysis of discretionary monetary policy.5 It implies that
the level of the predetermined nominal price P1,t does not restrict the outcomes a
5It is important not to misinterpret the parenthetical statement: any choice of Mt can be repli-
cated by choosing mt = Mt/P1,t. However, a policy of keeping Mt constant is not the same as a
policy of keeping mt constant.
10discretionary policymaker can achieve, as long as the monetary authority in future
periods behaves in the same manner.6
We now analyze outcomes under monetary discretion, proceeding in three steps
(with each a separate section of the paper). We begin by studying perfect foresight
settings. In section 3, we detail the nature of perfect foresight private sector equilibria
under a particular class of monetary policy rules. In section 4, we describe a full
discretionary equilibrium — with optimization by the monetary authority–in which
policy is shown to be in this class of rules. Finally, in section 5, we discuss stochastic
equilibria, with an optimizing private sector and monetary authority.
3 Equilibrium with homogeneous policy
We begin by studying the nature of equilibrium price-setting (p0,t) given an arbitrary
action by the monetary authority and given perfect foresight. We assume that the
monetary authority adopts a policy rule of the form
Mt = mtP0,t−1, (16)
where mt is viewed as the policy variable. That is, the money supply is proportional
to the prices that adjusting ﬁrms set one period ago with a constant of proportionality
mt.W ec a l lt h i sahomogenous monetary policy rule. This form of monetary accom-
modation of past nominal variables is characteristic of optimal monetary policy under
discretion, for the following reason. The monetary authority is concerned about the
real variables that enter in private agents’ utility. It takes past prices as given, and
there is no mechanism by which the level of nominal predetermined prices necessar-
ily constrains the behavior of a discretionary policymaker.7 Thus, if we viewed M
instead of m as the policy instrument, we would ﬁnd that the optimizing monetary
authority adjusted Mt proportionally to P1,t, just as is speciﬁed in (16). It will econ-
omize slightly on notation and computation to view mt as the policy instrument, and
there is no loss in generality. In a discretionary equilibrium, mt will be chosen to
maximize welfare; in this section mt is arbitrary.8
A homogenous money supply rule means that future monetary policy depends on
the price set by adjusting ﬁrms today,
Mt+1 = mt+1P0,t.
6If the future monetary authority paid attention to nominal levels, it might be optimal for the
current monetary authority to do the same. We do not consider equilibria with this property.
7The word “necessarily” appears because one could construct non-Markov equilibria in which
all agents agreed that P1,t did constrain the monetary authority. See previous footnote. We do not
study such equilibria.
8By contrast, under commitment, the monetary authority commits not to respond to P1,t, and
the choice is over sequences of Mt. King and Wolman (1999) study optimal policy with commitment
in the model used here.
11Consequently, under homogeneous policy and using the preferences introduced above,
it follows from the eﬃcient price-setting condition (11) that the nominal price set by




((1 − θt,t+1)mtP1,t + θt,t+1mt+1P0,t) (17)
in equilibrium. The derivation of (17) from (11) involves (i) using the fact that nom-
inal marginal cost is Ψt = Ptχct given the speciﬁc utility assumption; (ii) imposing
monetary equilibrium (Mt = Ptct); and (iii) imposing the homogenous form of the
monetary policy rule (Mt = mtP1,t). From (17), the normalized price set by adjusting






((1 − θt,t+1)mt + θt,t+1mt+1p0,t) (18)
≡ r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1).
The weight on future nominal marginal cost, which was deﬁned in (12), can be written




where we are now explicit about how θt,t+1 depends on the present and the future.
Equation (18) is a nonlinear diﬀerence equation in p0 and m that must be satisﬁed
in a perfect foresight equilibrium with homogeneous policy.
We view p0,t on the left-hand side of (18) as describing what an individual ﬁrm
ﬁnds optimal given the actions of other price-setters and the monetary authority. On
the right hand side, p0,t then represents all other adjusting ﬁrms’ pricing behavior,
and the function on the right hand side represents the implications of those ﬁrms’
behavior for the marginal revenues and costs of an individual ﬁrm. In other words,
r(.) is a best-response function for the individual ﬁrm. We restrict attention to sym-
metric equilibria, so that prices chosen by all adjusting ﬁrms are identical. We deﬁne
complementarity in terms of a positive partial derivative of the response function with
respect to its ﬁrst argument. That is: with perfect foresight, there is complementarity
if ∂r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1)/∂p0,t > 0.
In sections 3.2 and 3.3 below, we will make intensive use of the perfect-foresight
best-response function (18). First, we will use it to describe point-in-time equilibria;
this involves characterizing the ﬁxed points for p0,t,t a k i n ga sg i v e nmt,m t+1,a n d
p0,t+1. Second, we will use it to determine the model’s steady-state equilibria under
constant arbitrary policy. That is, we will impose p0,t = p0,t+1 and mt = mt+1 = m
and determine the equilibrium value(s) (ﬁxed points) for p0. Both of these exercises
will then serve as inputs to our analysis of discretionary equilibria. There, (18) will
summarize private sector equilibrium for any action that the monetary authority
12contemplates, under perfect foresight.9 With uncertainty, (18) will not hold exactly,
but the mechanisms discussed here will still be relevant.
3.1 Complementarity under homogeneous monetary policy
There are two mechanisms for complementarity in (17) and (18) that will be operative
in our analysis of both point-in-time and steady-state equilibria. First, holding ﬁxed
the weights, P0,t has a positive eﬀect on the right-hand side in (17): it enters linearly




θt,t+1mt+1, which is positive because ﬁrms are forward-
looking and the monetary authority raises nominal Mt+1 proportionately with P0,t.
Hence the speciﬁcation of monetary policy has introduced some complementarity into
an economy in which it was previously absent.
Second, the weights in these expressions vary with the current price P0,t (or its
normalized counter part p0,t). This additional channel plays an important role in our
analysis. A reference value for the weight θt,t+1 is one-half, since (12) implies that the
weight is β/(1+β) with β close to one if if Pt = Pt+1.A nu p p e rb o u n do nt h i sw e i g h t
is one: this is a situation where ﬁrms place full weight on the future. Increases in
t h ew e i g h tr a i s et h ee x t e n to ft h ee ﬀect discussed above, i.e., they raise the coeﬃcient ¡ εχ
ε−1
¢
θt,t+1mt+1 that measures the extent of complementarity. The second mechanism
is then that an increase in P0,t (or its normalized counterpart p0,t) raises the weight on
the future. This occurs because a ﬁrm’s proﬁts are not symmetric around its optimal
price. As the ﬁrm’s relative price rises, its proﬁts decline gradually, asymptotically
reaching zero as the price goes to inﬁnity. By contrast, as the price falls, the ﬁrms
proﬁts decline sharply toward zero and may even become highly negative if the ﬁrm
is not allowed to shut down its operations.10 Thus, when P0,t increases for all other
ﬁrms, future monetary accommodation — and the associated higher nominal price set
by ﬁrms in the future — automatically lower’s the ﬁrm’s future relative price. The
costliness of a low relative price leads the ﬁr mt op u ti n c r e a s e dw e i g h to nf u t u r e
marginal cost.
3.2 Equilibrium analysis of steady states
To characterize steady-state equilibria for arbitrary constant, homogeneous monetary
policies, we impose constant m and p0 on the right hand side of (18). Steady-state




m[1 − θ(p0,p 0)+θ(p0,p 0)p0], (20)
9If we impose mt = mt+1 but allow p0t to diﬀer from p0,t+1, then (18) describes the dynamics
of p0,t for constant homogeneous policy. Such analysis might reveal interesting dynamics. However,
it is not an input into our analysis of discretionary equilibrium.
10At this point in the analysis, we do not explicitly take into account the shut-down possibility.
But, when we calculate discretionary equilibria, we do verify that the equilibria are robust to allowing
ﬁrms to shut down.









Fixed points of the steady-state best-response function are constructed by simulta-
neously varying current and future p0 on the right hand side. This is in contrast to
ﬁxed points of the basic point-in-time best-response function, which are constructed
holding ﬁxed p0,t+1.
3.2.1 Uniqueness occurs at zero inﬂation
A zero inﬂation steady state involves p0 =1 . Such a steady state exists when the
normalized quantity of money is m∗ ≡ ( ε
ε−1χ)−1. In this case, the weight on the
future is θ = β/(1 + β), which is roughly one-half. The zero-inﬂation steady state is
asymptotically optimal under full commitment in this model (see King and Wolman
[1999]) and provides an important benchmark. Furthermore, if m = m∗, zero inﬂation
is the unique steady state; that is, p0 =1is the unique solution to (20) when m = m∗.
3.2.2 Multiplicity or nonexistence must occur with positive inﬂation
We refer to any m>m ∗ as an inﬂationary monetary policy, because if inﬂation is
positive in a steady state, then m>m ∗, as we now show. From (20), given that






[1 − θ + θπ]
=
1




Thus, π > 1 if and only if m>m ∗.
Proposition 1 states that under an arbitrary inﬂationary monetary policy, for low
values of m there are two steady-state equilibrium values of p0. For high values of m,
no steady-state equilibrium exists. In a knife edge case there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists an e m>m ∗ such that for m ∈ (m∗, e m) there are two
steady-state equilibria, and for m>e m there is no steady-state equilibrium.
Proof. see Appendix.
From (20), steady-state equilibria for a given m are ﬁxed points of r(p0;m), where
we write the best-response function as
r(p0,m)=
m
m∗ · [(1 − θ(p0)) + θ(p0) · p0] (22)
for the discussion of proposition 1.
14Figure 1 provides the basis for a heuristic discussion of Proposition 1, based on
the best-response function r(). The dashed line in Figure 1 is the 45o line; when
r() crosses this line the action of a representative adjusting ﬁrm (the horizontal axis)
coincides with the optimal action of an individual ﬁrm as described by r().T h es o l i d
line is r() for m>m ∗. When m = m∗ it is easy to see from (22) that there is one
steady state, and it occurs at p0 =1 . An increase in m shifts r() upwards. It is
thus clear that p0 =1is not an equilibrium point with m>m ∗, but that there is
a prospect for an intersection point somewhere to the right as in the case illustrated
in Figure 1. At any such “low” stationary equilibrium, it must be the case that the
slope is less than one (if r(p0,.) crosses the 45o line) or the slope is exactly equal to
one (if it is a tangency). Let us call this ﬁrst equilibrium p0.
Suppose the slope at a “low” stationary equilibrium is less than one, so that it is
not a tangency and corresponds to the case illustrated in Figure 1. As p0 becomes
arbitrarily large, θ → 1.F o rl a r g ep0, then, it follows that r(p0,.) approaches the line
(m/m∗)p0 from below. For high enough p0 then, r(p0,.) >p 0 since we are considering
an inﬂationary monetary policy (m>m ∗). We have assumed there was a ﬁxed point
at which ∂r/∂p0 < 1, a n dw eh a v es h o w nt h a tr() lies above the 450 line for high
enough p0, so there must be some other “high” p0 for which there is an equilibrium
r(p0)=p0.I f m is high enough, the ﬁrst ﬁxed point does not exist, and r() lies
everywhere above the 45o line. We label the two equilibria with an asterisk (*) and
carry them over to our discussion below.
There are two mechanisms at work to produce multiple steady-state rates of inﬂa-
tion for arbitrary constant, homogeneous monetary policy. The ﬁrst is that monetary
policy is accommodative: if higher prices are set by other ﬁrms today, the future
nominal money stock will be higher in proportion. The second is that if all other
ﬁrms raise prices today and in the future, then the future inﬂation rate will rise and
as i n g l eﬁrm today places higher weight on future nominal marginal costs, so that
future monetary endogeneity becomes more inﬂuential on current price-setting. Look-
ing ahead, the discretionary equilibria we will construct below will involve constant,
homogeneous monetary policy. Necessarily, then, there will be multiple steady-state
equilibria under discretion. However, in order to construct those equilibria we cannot
rely on the steady-state best-response function.
3.3 Point-in-time equilibria
Solving the monetary authority’s problem under discretion means computing the
point-in-time equilibria that correspond to all possible current policy actions, and
then picking the best action. Before studying this topic in detail in section 4, we here
begin by characterizing point-in-time equilibria for an arbitrary policy action in the
current period. Point-in-time equilibrium refers to the values of p0,t that solve (18) for
given current and future monetary actions, and a given future price p0,t+1.The mecha-
nisms described earlier lead to the potential for multiple point-in-time equilibria. We
15assume that the future money supply is given by mt+1 ∈ (m∗, e m), (i.e. steady-state
equilibria do exist for the assumed value of mt+1 and are inﬂationary) and that the
future relative price is consistent with one of the two steady-state equilibria that may
prevail if that level of mt+1 is maintained forever. Under these assumptions, there
are either two equilibria in the current period or equilibrium does not exist. Again,
in a knife edge case equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 2 If mt+1 ∈ (m∗, e m) is ﬁxed, then there exists ˘ m such that for mt < ˘ m
there are two equilibria in period t, and for mt > ˘ m equilibrium does not exist in
period t.
Proof. see appendix for a sketch.
Point-in-time equilibria are ﬁxed points of the best-response function for current
period price-setters, which we write without time subscripts, using superscript prime












No expectation operator appears because we are assuming, for the purposes of this
section, that there is no uncertainty about future m and — more importantly — future
p0. Multiplicity of point-in-time equilibria occurs for much the same reason as multi-
plicity of steady states. Because the future nominal money supply is endogenous, the
current price of other ﬁrms has an eﬀect of more than one-for-one on a single ﬁrm’s
desired price if agents weight the future heavily, as they do if m0 >m ∗ and p0 is high
enough. Note that as long as the future money supply is inﬂationary, there will be
multiple equilibria even for noninﬂationary current values of the money supply.
Figure 2 illustrates the multiplicity of point-in-time equilibria for m = m0 >m ∗,
for two diﬀerent beliefs about future p0. As above, the dashed line is the 450 line that
identiﬁes ﬁxed points: the two points marked with asterisks (‘*’) on the 45o line are
the steady states from Figure 1. The solid line is the best-response function when
agents expect p0 in the future, with certainty. The low steady state is a point-in-time
equilibrium when agents expect p0 in the future, but the high steady state is not,
because in that steady state agents expect p0 rather than p0 in the future. In fact,
the second point-in-time equilibrium must be at a higher p0, because expectations
make the future less important than in the steady-state analysis of Figure 1: a larger
increase in the weight on the future is required for the second ﬁxed point to occur.
The dotted line shows the best-response function when agents expect p0 in the future,
with certainty. In this case the higher of the two steady-state equilibria survives as a
point-in-time equilibrium, but the the low-inﬂation point-in-time equilibrium is now
higher than the low-inﬂation steady state.
From (23), note that for given m0, lower m drives down the lower price equilibrium
and drives up the higher price equilibrium. Lower current m shifts the best-response
function down, with lower current marginal cost reducing the ﬁrm’s optimal price
16f o ra n yp r i c es e tb yo t h e rﬁrms. The lower ﬁxed point falls, but because the basic
properties of the response function are unchanged, there is still a second ﬁxed point,
now at a higher level of p0; at this high level of p0, high future marginal cost oﬀsets
the lower current marginal cost. Current monetary policy actions thus aﬀect the two
equilibria in very diﬀerent ways.
Figure 2 illustrates that beliefs about both current and future equilibrium selection
can aﬀect the opportunities available to a discretionary monetary authority. Raising
the current money supply shifts out the best-response function for ﬁrms, resulting
in a lower high-p0 equilibrium and higher low-p0 equilibrium. The likelihood of each
equilibrium in the present will thus alter the trade-oﬀ facing the monetary author-
ity. Beliefs about future equilibrium selection shift the current period best-response
function for a given current money supply, and thus also alter the trade-oﬀ facing the
current monetary authority.
4 Discretion under perfect foresight
In a perfect foresight discretionary equilibrium, the current monetary authority sets
the money stock to maximize the representative private agent’s welfare, subject to
1. The behavior of the future monetary authority (m0).
2 .T h eb e h a v i o ro fﬁrms in the future (p0
0).
3. Optimal pricing by ﬁrms in the current period (p0). The monetary authority
must have beliefs about the selection rule used to determine p0 when a contem-
plated value of m leads to multiple equilibrium values of p0.
Two conditions deﬁne a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium with discretion:
(i) the current and future monetary authority each choose the same action; and (ii)
the selection rule speciﬁes that only one equilibrium will prevail in every period. It
is common knowledge which equilibrium will prevail.
As we noted above, it is the essence of discretion in monetary policy that certain
predetermined nominal variables are taken as given by the monetary authority. Here,
the current money supply is set proportionally to the previously set price, P1,t =
P0,t−1. T h i sl e a d su st ov i e wm as the monetary authority’s choice variable. Our
analysis of equilibrium under arbitrary choice of m revealed that in general there
were either two point-in-time equilibria or no point-in-time equilibria, as long as future
policy was expected to be inﬂationary. This leads us to expect multiple discretionary
equilibria. In this section we analyze discretionary equilibria where there is a constant
probability of 1.0 on one of the two private sector equilibria.11
11Wolman [2001] determines the (unique) optimal allocation that can be achieved by a mone-
tary authority that is constrained by discretion, using a primal approach that is silent on how the
174.1 Constructing Discretionary Equilibria
We look for a stationary, discretionary equilibrium, which is a value of m that max-
imizes u(c,l) subject to the constraints above when m0 = m.12 We have used two
computational approaches to ﬁnd this ﬁxed point. A comparison of the two ap-
proaches is revealing about the nature of the multiple equilibria we encounter.
The ﬁrst computational method involves iterating on steady states. We assume
that all future monetary authorities follow some ﬁxed rule m0. Next, we determine
the steady state that prevails including the value of p0
0. Then, we confront the cur-
rent monetary policy authority with these beliefs and ask her to optimize, given the
constraints including the selection rule. If she chooses an m such that |m − m0| is
suﬃciently small, then we have an approximate ﬁxed point. If not, then we adjust
the future monetary policy rule in the direction of her choice and go through the
process again until we have achieved an approximate ﬁxed point. This approach con-
ceptually matches our discussion throughout the text, but leaves open an important
economic question: are the equilibria that we construct critically dependent on the
inﬁnite horizon nature of the problem?
The second computational method involves backward induction on ﬁnite horizon
economies. We begin with a last period, in which ﬁrms are not forward-looking in
their price setting and deduce that there is a single equilibrium, including an optimal
action for the monetary authority mT >m ∗ and a unique equilibrium relative price
p0,T. Then, we step back one period, taking as given the future monetary action and
the future relative price. We ﬁnd that there are two private sector equilibria. In fact,
this is inevitable, because the ﬁrst step backwards creates a version of our point-in-
time analysis above. Consequently, this approach establishes that the phenomena
are associated with forward-looking pricing and homogenous monetary policy, rather
than with an inﬁnite horizon. To construct stationary nonstochastic equilibria using
this approach, we can iterate backwards from the last period, computing the optimal
policy, {mT,m T−1,....} and stop the process when |mt+1−mt| is small, taking mt = m
as an approximate ﬁxed point.
The numerical examples that we study next have the following common elements.
The demand elasticity (ε)i s10, implying a gross markup of 1.11 i naz e r oi n ﬂation
steady state. The preference parameter (χ)i s0.9, and for convenience we set the time
endowment to 5. Taken together with the markup, this implies that agents will work
one ﬁfth of their time (n =1 )i naz e r oi n ﬂation steady state. With zero inﬂation,
c = n =1since there are no relative price distortions, and thus m∗ =1 .F u r t h e r ,
leisure (l)i st h e n5 − c. Accordingly, in a zero inﬂation stationary state, utility is
monetary authority brings about this allocation using monetary instruments. This allocation is the
o n ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h el o w - p0 equilibrium described here. Our work thus shows that a monetary
authority which seeks to implement the optimal real allocation using a money stock rule leaves itself
vulnerable to multiple equilibria.
12Dotsey and Hornstein [2003] use linear-quadratic methods to study the monetary policy problem
under discretion. We believe that these essentially rule out the phenomena encountered in this paper.
18just ln(1)+0.9·(5−1).Aﬁrst-best outcome would dictate that u(c,l) be maximized
subject to c =( 1 −l).F o rt h es p e c i ﬁed preferences, this leads to a ﬁrst order condition
1
n = χ or an eﬃcient level of work (n)o f1.11. So, the increase in work from cutting
the gross markup to one is 11.1%.
4.2 Optimistic Equilibrium
If the discretionary monetary authority knows that the low equilibrium will prevail,





0;m0) denotes the future utility that corresponds to a steady state with




p0 = r(p0,p 0
0,m,m
0),
where r() denotes the response function on the right hand side of (23), and the
presence of p0 instead of p0 is meant to imply that we place probability one on the
low-p0 ﬁxed point of the response function. The monetary authority understands
that future utility and current price determination is inﬂuenced by the actions of the
future monetary authority, but has no way of inﬂuencing its behavior or the future
price that will prevail. So, the monetary authority maximizes current period utility.
4.2.1 Exploiting initial conditions
Figure 3 provides some insight into the nature of the monetary authority’s choice
when it knows that the p0 equilibrium will prevail for all time. For this ﬁgure, we
assume that future monetary policy is noninﬂationary (m0 = m∗, p0
0 =1 ) . The cur-
rent monetary authority optimally adopts an inﬂationary monetary policy (choosing
m>m ∗ =1 ) because it can reduce the markup and stimulate consumption toward
the ﬁrst-best level. It does not completely drive the gross markup to one because
an increase in m produces relative price distortions. While the relative price distor-
tions are negligible near the noninﬂationary steady state, they increase convexly as
monetary policy stimulates the economy. Figure 3 illustrates the sense in which New
Keynesian models capture the incentive for stimulating the economy at zero inﬂation,
as described in Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983].
4.2.2 An inﬂation bias equilibrium
Figure 4 displays the consistent steady-state equilibrium, in which agents correctly
forecast the incentives of the monetary authority. Panel A shows the policymaker’s
19objective function, which can be thought of as an indirect utility function: the relevant
portion for the current discussion is the solid line, which reaches a maximum at the
value of m/m∗ =1.01. This implies a stationary relative price (p0)o f1.022,w h i c hi s
determined along the lines of Figure 2 with agents expecting p0
0 = p0 and m0 = m.
Given that there is a steady state, π = p0 and this relative price thus implies an
inﬂation rate of 2.2 % per quarter. At this inﬂation rate, the monetary authority
faces suﬃciently increasing marginal relative price distortions that it chooses not to
further increase m in an eﬀort to further reduce the markup. Notably, the stationary
markup departs little from its value at zero inﬂation. Stationary consumption is
99.96% of its zero inﬂation value, so that the markup has changed negligibly (recall
that the markup and consumption are directly related by µt =( ctχ)
−1 with the
preference speciﬁcation used here).
4.3 Pessimistic Equilibrium
We next suppose that the monetary authority instead knows that the high p0 equi-
librium will always prevail. Its incentives are sharply diﬀerent. Looking at Figure
4, we can see these incentives in the dashed lines, which describe a non-equilibrium
situation in which the private sector and the monetary authority assume that the
future is described by m,p
0 while the present is described by ¯ p0.T h em o n e t a r ya u -
thority has a clear incentive to raise m>m since this lowers the markup and relative
price distortions, with utility being maximized when m is suﬃciently high that there
is exactly a tangency equilibrium in the temporary equilibrium analysis of Figure
2. Here the monetary authority “takes policy to the limit” of the set of equilibria
that are imposed as its constraints. Because Figure 4 assumes optimism (that is,
the low-p0 outcome occurs with probability one) , there are some inconsistencies in
using Figure 4 to discuss an equilibrium with pessimistic expectations. Notably, the
monetary authority can lower the markup to less than one, in which case some of the
ﬁrms in the economy are making losses. But the picture tells the right story: nearer
the consistent discretionary equilibrium that is described by a level m,t h em o n e t a r y
authority still has the same incentives to raise m, but it does so without producing
the curious behavior of the markup shown here.
In fact, it is not necessary to make a complicated set of ﬁxed point computations in
this case. A tangency equilibrium is one in which
∂r(p0,t,mt,p0,t+1,mt+1)
∂p0,t =1 . Therefore,
we can simply solve the stationary version of the equation,
p0,t
∂r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1)
∂p0,t
= r(p0,t,m t,p 0,t+1,m t+1),
to calculate the equilibrium value of p0 ( t h i si so n ee q u a t i o ni no n eu n k n o w np0
because the m = m0 drops out). We can then determine the relevant m from the
equation p0 = r(p0,p 0,m,m).
20In our numerical example, there is a consistent equilibrium with p0 =1 .17,s ot h a t
there is a 17% quarterly inﬂation rate in the pessimistic equilibrium with optimal
discretionary policy. The associated value of m/m∗ is 1.0295.T h i s v a l u e i s l a r g e r
than the one used to construct Figure 3, as it should be: a higher level of m is
necessary to produce a tangency equilibrium in the pessimistic case.
There are thus two steady-state equilibria with discretionary optimal monetary
policy in our quantitative example, one with low inﬂation and one with high inﬂation.
The levels of the inﬂation rates are quite diﬀerent: about 2 percent (per quarter) in
one case and about 17 percent in the other.
5 Stochastic equilibria
The generic existence of two point-in-time equilibria and two steady-state equilibria
for arbitrary homogeneous policy suggests that it may be possible to construct discre-
tionary equilibria that involve stochastic ﬂuctuations. We now provide an example of
such an equilibrium. We assume that there is an i.i.d. sunspot realized each period
which selects between the two private sector equilibria: in each period, the low-p0
outcome occurs with probability 0.6, the high-p0 outcome occurs with probability of
0.4, and this is common knowledge.13
In order for its maximization problem to be well-deﬁned, the monetary author-
ity must have beliefs about the current and future distribution over private-sector
equilibria. Above, these beliefs were degenerate. Now that they are nondegenerate,
the problem is slightly more complicated. Letting α b et h ep r o b a b i l i t yo ft h el o w - p0
outcome, the monetary authority maximizes
{αu(c(m,p0),l(m,p0)) + (1 − α)u(c(m,p0),l(m,p0))} + βv
0
where v0 denotes the future expected utility, which again cannot be inﬂuenced by the
current monetary authority. It is important to stress that the low and high p0 values







































13Our model does not pin down the distribution of the sunspot variable. However, some restric-
tions on that distribution are imposed by the requirement that every ﬁrm’s proﬁts be nonnegative in
each period. For example, if α is 0.75 rather than 0.6, this condition is violated in the p0 state, and
no discretionary equilibrium exists. As in Ennis and Keister (forthcoming), it would be interesting
to study whether adaptive learning schemes would further restrict the distribution of the sunspot
variable.
21Because the sunspot is i.i.d., this expression holds for both the low and high current
value of p0. Note that uncertainty prevents us from writing (24) as the simple weighted
a v e r a g et h a tw eu s e dw i t h perfect foresight.
5.1 Constructing Discretionary Equilibria
We can again apply the two computational approaches described in the previous
section to construct Nash equilibria. In implementing these, we assume that the
monetary authority and the private sector share the same probability beliefs.
5.2 Optimal discretionary policy
The relevant trade-oﬀs for the discretionary monetary authority are illustrated in
Figure 5. In panel A, there is a light solid line between the objective function for
the low-p0 private-sector equilibrium (the dark solid line) and the objective function
for the high-p0 private sector equilibrium (the dashed line): this is the monetary
authority’s expected utility objective, which is a weighted average of the two other
objectives. The monetary authority chooses an optimal action that is about 1.0202,
which is more stimulative than the earlier equilibrium action (1.01, shown in Figure
4) that was appropriate under extreme optimism (α =1 ) .B u ti ti ss m a l l e rt h a nt h e
equilibrium action appropriate under extreme pessimism (α =0 ).
F i g u r e5a l s oh i g h l i g h t st h a tt h es p e c i ﬁc values taken on by p0 in the optimistic
and pessimistic equilibrium are endogenously determined in our setup, by current
monetary policy and the sunspot probabilities. By contrast, in the essentially static
models of Albanesi, Chari and Christiano [2002], the values of endogenous variables
are not aﬀected by the probability structure of extrinsic uncertainty.
5.3 Eﬀects of sunspots
Consider now the eﬀects of a sunspot on equilibrium quantities. We take as the refer-
ence point the levels in the low-p0 private-sector equilibrium, which involve a markup
of about 1.11 (close to the zero inﬂation markup) and a normalized price that is close
to one. If the economy suddenly shifts to the high-p0 private sector equilibrium as a
result of the sunspot, then ﬁrms become much more aggressive in their adjustments.
With the nominal money stock ﬁxed (Mt = mP1,t−1), there is a decline in real ag-
gregate demand since the price level rises. Consumption and work eﬀort accordingly
fall. Alternatively, the average markup rises dramatically, increasing distortions in
the economy, to bring about this set of results. Quantitatively, in Figure 5, the rise
in the markup is from about 1.12 to about 1.17, so that there is roughly a 4.5%
increase in the markup. Given that markups and consumption are (inversely) related
proportionately, there is a 4.5% decline in consumption and work eﬀort.
22These outcomes are interpretable as an incident of “unexpected stagﬂation” aris-
ing because of shifting beliefs. It does not correspond to the more sustained shifts
in beliefs that Goodfriend [1993] describes as “inﬂation scares”, which are associated
with increases in long-term expectations of inﬂation as reﬂected in market interest
rates. To consider such eﬀects, which may be important for understanding the inter-
action of the U.S. central bank with the real economy during the post-war period,
one could introduce persistence in the probabilities of future equilibrium selection.
6 Summary and conclusions
We have described equilibria under discretionary monetary policy in a basic New-
Keynesian model with two-period staggered price setting. The trade-oﬀ that our
monetary authority faces is a familiar one. Output is ineﬃciently low because ﬁrms
have monopoly power, which creates an incentive for the monetary authority to pro-
vide unexpected stimulus, exploiting the pre-set prices and raising output. However,
when it exploits pre-set prices, the monetary authority also raises the dispersion of
prices, leading to an ineﬃcient allocation of resources. In equilibrium, the monetary
authority is balancing the marginal contribution of these two eﬀects.
While the monetary policy trade-oﬀ is familiar, the nature of equilibrium is not.
Discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. The multiplicity occurs
because of complementarity in pricing behavior that is induced by the monetary au-
thority’s natural tendency to treat the level of pre-set nominal prices as a bygone.
Under discretion, in each period the monetary authority moves the nominal money
supply proportionately with the nominal level of pre-set prices. This feature of mon-
etary policy means that higher prices set by ﬁrms in the current period will lead to a
higher money supply (and even higher prices) in the subsequent period. Understand-
ing this mechanism, an individual ﬁrm adjusting its price in the current period ﬁnds
it optimal to raise its price in response to higher prices set by other ﬁrms. That is:
there is a complementarity in pricing, which leads to multiple equilibria.
When we consider discretionary equilibria that are driven by a sunspot variable,
the equilibria involve random ﬂuctuations between diﬀerent real outcomes.14 If all
ﬁrms choose to raise prices by a large amount because they (rationally) believe that
others are raising prices, the result is a reduction in real aggregate demand and a
decline in output relative to the level that would prevail if smaller price adjustments
took place. Economic volatility then, as well as high inﬂation, may be a cost of
discretion in monetary policy.
14The distribution of the sunspot variable shifts the equilibrium, and while we do not pin down
that distribution, it is an integral part of the deﬁnition of equilibrium. Thus far, we have only
considered i.i.d. sunspot variations, so as to produce the simplest possible explanation of the source
and nature of multiple equilibria. In future work, we plan to extend the analysis to the implications
of persistent sunspots. This extension would allow us to take the model more seriously as a potential
explanation for some of the volatility observed in actual macroeconomic time series.
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25A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . (i) The conditions which characterize a steady-state
equilibrium are (20) and (21). Multiplying (20) by the denominator of (21) reveals
that these conditions are equivalent to











Steady-state equilibria are thus ﬁxed points of h(), and ﬁxed points of h() are steady-
state equilibria.
(ii) For p0 > 0 the function h() is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly
convex.
(iii) Deﬁne e p0 implicitly as follows:
e p0 : h
0 (e p0)=1 .








and e p0 is decreasing in m.
Convexity of h() implies that if h(e p0) > e p0 then h() does not have a ﬁxed point,
and if h(e p0) <p 0 then h() has two ﬁx e dp o i n t s .W en o wn e e dt os h o wt h a tf o rl o wm,









It is straightforward to show from (28) that there is a unique value of m, call it e m
such that h(e p0) ≶ e p0 for m ≶ e m.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . (Sketch) From (18) and (19), point-in-time equilibrium

















for ﬁxed m0 >m ∗ and p0
0.
(i) The left side is strictly concave and increasing; the right hand side is strictly
increasing (since ε > 1), and either strictly concave (if ε < 2) or strictly convex (if
ε > 2).
26(ii) LHS →− ∞as p0 → 0+,a n d lim
p0→∞LHS = m∗.
(iii) RHS (0) = 0.R H S→∞as p0 →∞ .
(iv) Thus, this equation has either two solutions or no solutions.
(v) Can show there is a unique m, call it ˘ m such that LHS and RHS are tangent.

























































































































































































































 Figure 3.  The temptation to stimulate a zero-inflation economy
                                               (m'=1.0) Figure 4.  Discretionary equilibrium with optimism (low p  expectations)
                                       Equilibrium m=1.010
0 Figure 5.  Discretionary equilibrium with Prob(low p  )=0.6
                       Equilibrium m=1.020156
0